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This paper empirically investigates distributional and welfare eﬀects of Germany’s year
2000 income tax reform. The reform is simulated in an ex-ante behavioral microsimu-
lation approach. Dead weight loss of changes in capital income taxation is estimated in
a structural model for household savings and asset demand applied to German survey
data. Signiﬁcant reductions in tax rates result in income gains for most of the households.
Gains are found greater for households in higher tax brackets, whereby income inequality
increases, slightly greater in East- than in West-Germany. Moreover, households increase
savings and alter the structure of asset demand as a result of shifts in relative asset prices.
As a consequence, utility losses reduce welfare eﬀects for almost all households.
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1 1 Introduction
At the turn of the century, a governmental coalition of the green party and the social democrats
enforced the greatest tax reform of post-war Germany, measured by tax relief. The main
intention was to bring forward employment and economic growth by lowering tax burdens and
distorting eﬀects of taxation for corporates, entrepreneurs, and other private households. The
reform, on the one hand, signiﬁcantly altered the tax tariﬀ, and on the other hand largely
broadened the tax base. The income tax tariﬀ was generally shifted downwards, and taxation
schemes as well as allowances for capital income were adjusted. According to Germany’s federal
ministry of ﬁnance, the reform had a total annual tax relief of 32 bn. euros, of which about 27
bn. euros are related to changes in personal income taxation (Bundesministerium der Finanzen,
2004). As a result, families, employees, and non-incorporated medium-sized enterprises were
meant to beneﬁt the greatest from the reform. These aggregate numbers do though not tell
the whole story, as nothing is said yet about the distribution of the gains and about welfare
eﬀects regarding savings and asset demand.
There are a couple of studies that analyze distributional eﬀects of Germany’s year 2000
tax reform in various contexts: some comparing them to other reform proposals (Merz and
Zwick, 2002; Bönke and Corneo, 2006) or to alternative methods of measurement (Maiterth
and Müller, 2009), some in the context of tax avoidance (Corneo, 2005), others putting them in
an intergenerational perspective (Krimmer and Raﬀelhüschen, 2003), and again others explicitly
accounting for labor supply reactions and estimating welfare eﬀects (Haan and Steiner, 2005;
Wagenhals, 2001). However, there is no empirical evidence yet on welfare eﬀects of this reform
that are related to adjustments of the consumption-savings behavior and the structure of asset
demand. The reform is though likely to aﬀect aggregate savings of private households as well
as the allocation of savings between various available asset types, as the relative prices of
consumption and savings as well as the relative after-tax returns of related assets are altered.
This analysis intends to investigate distributional and welfare eﬀects of Germany’s year 2000
tax reform that are related to households’ savings as well as asset allocation behavior.
There is a vast literature of studies that empirically identify eﬀects of diﬀerential income
taxation in general on asset allocation.1 These studies generally ﬁnd signiﬁcant eﬀects of dif-
ferential income taxation on asset allocation, though of varying size: demand for tax-privileged
assets is lowered and demand for less privileged assets is increased if marginal tax rates are
1Among these studies, the most inﬂuential are Feldstein (1976); Hubbard (1985); King and Leape (1998);
Poterba and Samwick (2002); Dicks-Mireaux and King (1983); Hochguertel, Alessie, and van Soest (1997);
Agell and Edin (1990). For Germany, only Lang (1998) conducts a comparable analysis. A comprehensive
overview on relevant issues in the ﬁeld of taxation eﬀects on household asset allocation, such as diﬀerential
income taxation, is provided by Poterba (2002).
2shifted downwards. Hausman and Poterba (1987) analyze eﬀects of the 1986 tax reform act
in the US on labor supply as well as eﬀects on household savings. They ﬁnd that aggregate
savings are slightly reduced by the reform. An increase in savings due to rising net returns
resulting from massive reductions of marginal tax rates is oﬀset by a decrease due to falling
gross returns as a result of heavier taxation of corporate capital. The recent literature in this
ﬁeld ﬁnds stronger eﬀects of the rate of return on single assets than for savings in general (see
Attanasio and Wakeﬁeld, 2010, for a survey). For a study on the distributional eﬀects of a
value-added tax reform for Germany using the same micro data that are used here, see Bach,
Haan, Hoﬀmeister, and Steiner (2006).
This brief literature review suggests on the one hand that there were signiﬁcant income gains
to be distributed from Germany’s year 2000 income tax reform and on the other hand that
changes in the tax schedule play a relevant role for households’ savings behavior and asset
choice. However, there is by now only very scarce empirical literature on the quantiﬁcation
of welfare eﬀects related to capital income taxation that result from tax-induced distortions
in portfolio structure, primarily due to a lack of structural modeling of the portfolio choice.2
Poterba and Samwick (2002) e.g., delegate this issue to one of the most important concerns for
future research, and even in the most recent literature in this ﬁeld, the estimation of deadweight
loss in a structural portfolio model is still on top of the agenda for future research (Alan, Atalay,
Crossley, and Jeon, 2010).
The analysis at hand extends the literature by quantifying distributional and welfare eﬀects
of the reform that are related to savings and asset demand. The focus is on that part of the
tax reform that aﬀects private households. For analyses of the eﬀects of the tax reform on
incorporated companies, see Homburg (2000); Schreiber (2000); Keen (2002), or for a general
equilibrium approach, Sørensen (2002). The reform is evaluated in an ex-ante analysis and
simulated in an income taxation module in the framework of a static behavioral microsimulation
model of household savings and asset demand. The model is estimated using the 1998 cross
section from oﬃcial survey data on income and consumption in Germany. Behavioral responses
are derived from demand elasticities estimated in a microeconomic model of asset demand.
In line with the literature, income gains are found for most of the households through substan-
tial reductions of marginal tax rates. Income inequality is found to increase, slightly stronger
in East- than in West-Germany, as the gains are greater for households in higher tax brackets.
Moreover, households are induced to increase savings and alter the structure of asset demand
as a result of the income gains as well as shifts in relative asset prices. This substitution causes
2While there is extensive literature on theoretical aspects of optimal taxation of capital income (see Sandmo,
1985; Bernheim, 2002, for surveys), empirical evidence is basically limited to a couple of studies on eﬀects
of capital gains taxation mainly for the U.S., surveyed in Poterba and Samwick (2002).
3deadweight loss, so that welfare eﬀects are lower than income gains for most of the households.
Utility losses are found to be signiﬁcantly greater for households with relatively high savings
ratios and great asset demand. In the next section, the major changes from the reform are
brieﬂy introduced. Section 3 presents the data applied and the methodology for evaluating
the tax reform. In Section 4, results for distributional and welfare eﬀects are discussed, and
Section 5 concludes.
2 Germany’s Year 2000 Income Tax Reform
Germany’s year 2000 income tax reform was implemented in three steps: the ﬁrst step was
initiated at the beginning of the year 2001. The second step was postponed to the beginning
of the year 2004 due to excessive costs resulting from a ﬂood in 2002. Finally, the third step
of the reform was implemented at the beginning of the year 2005. The year 2000 tax reform,
as it shall be subject to analysis, consists of three single laws: the “Steuersenkungsgesetz”
(StSenkG), the “Steuersenkungsergänzungsgesetz” (StSenkErgG), and the “Steuerentlastungs-
gesetz 1999/2000/2002”, see Bach, Corneo, and Steiner (2008), for an overview. Generally,
changes from all three laws shall be considered here.
However, as this analysis shall focus only on that part of the reform that aﬀected private
households, changes at the taxation of corporate proﬁt are only considered as far as they directly
aﬀect the after-tax return of shareholders, in this case through a change in the taxation scheme
for dividends. Changes related to the income tax also aﬀect income of entrepreneurs and
proprietors from non-incorporated business partnerships (“Personengesellschaften”), as such
income is subject to personal income tax (PIT). The focus shall be on the shifts in the tariﬀ of
the PIT as well as on a couple of reform components related to the taxation of capital income
that are targeted to broaden the tax base and that may aﬀect households’ consumption-savings
decision as well as asset demand through variation in the net asset returns. The components
of the reform that are considered in this analysis shall be brieﬂy described in the following.
On the one hand, the reform generally shifted the PIT tariﬀ by gradually lowering the rates
and at the same time, increasing the general tax-free allowance. The development of the PIT
rates for the top and the initial rate as well as the general allowance and the allowance on
capital income is plotted in Figure 1 over the time frame of the reform. By the reform, the
PIT tariﬀ was generally shifted downwards. The top marginal tax rate, excluding solidarity
surcharge of 5.5%, was lowered from 53:0% in 1998 to 51:0% in 2000, to 48:5% in 2001, then
to 45:0% in 2004, and ﬁnally to 42:0% in 2005. Meanwhile, the initial rate was also lowered
from 25:9% in 1998 to 23:9% in 1999, to 22:9% in 2000, to 19:9% in 2001, then to 16:0% in
2004, and ﬁnally to 15:0% in 2005. At the same time, the tax-free allowance was increased
4from 6,322 euros in 1998 to 6,681 euros in 1999, to 6,902 euros in 2000, to 7,206 euros in 2001,
to 7,235 euros in 2002, and then to 7,664 euros in 2004, whereupon it stayed constant in 2005
(Bundesministerium der Finanzen, 2004).








top marginal tax rate (%)
initial marginal tax rate (%)
general allowance (euros)
allowance on capital income (euros)
6322 6681 6902 7206 7235 7235 7664 7664
3068 3068
1534 1534 1550 1550 1550 1370
1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005
Year
Notes: Tax rates exclude solidarity surcharge of 5.5%.
Source: Own illustration.
On the other hand, the reform broadened the tax base by altering the taxation schemes and
allowances for income from the investment of capital.3 The tax-free allowance on income from
ﬁnancial capital was gradually reduced, as plotted in Figure 1: for singles, from 3,068 euros
in 1998 to 1,534 euros in 2000, then slightly increased to 1,550 euros in 2002, and then again
reduced to 1,370 euros in 2005. The taxation of dividends was changed from the imputation
scheme (“Anrechnungsverfahren”) to the half-dividend scheme (“Halbeinkünfteverfahren”). Be-
fore the reform, gross dividends at the shareholder level were subject to PIT, and there was
a withholding tax (KEST) prepayment of 25%, while the corporate tax payment (30% for
distributed proﬁts) was considered as a tax credit. After the reform, net dividends (“Bardivi-
dende”)4 were subject to PIT, with only 50% of the net dividend taxable, and the KEST was
3These changes are mostly based on the “Steuerentlastungsgesetz 1999/2000/2002”.
4Net dividends are net of corparate taxes and net of KEST at the shareholder level.
5reduced to 20%. The tax credit of corporate taxes (reduced to 25%) was abolished.
Moreover, allowances for purchasing expenses related to owner-occupied housing were ad-
justed. If construction of the house was started between 01.01.1996 and 01.01.1999, expenses
could be deducted as initial costs according to §10i EStG in line with the home-building al-
lowance (“Eigenheimzulage”), see Ochmann (2010) for more details. Also, time frames for tax
exemption of price arbitrage sales of several asset types were altered. This time frame was
increased from six months to twelve months for sales of equities, i.e. stocks and bonds. It
was increased from two to ten years for non-owner-occupied housing assets, while for owner-
occupied housing assets, the time frame of two years was abolished, so that income from such
sales is generally tax exempt after the reform.5
It is assumed in this analysis that the tax reform is ﬁnanced, apart from the self-ﬁnancing
eﬀects through the broadening of the tax base, by deﬁcit spending. Thus, there are no immedi-
ate cuts in any transfer payments to households, so that there will result a non-negative income
gain for almost every household through the reform.6 These income gains and their distribution
by taxable income shall be subject to analysis in the following. In addition, the income gain
is expected to aﬀect the households’ consumption-savings behavior as well as asset demand,
from which welfare eﬀects shall be derived. Firstly, the data used and the methodology for the
reform evaluation are presented in the next section.
3 Data and Methodology
3.1 Data
The data applied in this analysis stem from the Income and Consumption Survey for Germany
(“Einkommens- und Verbrauchsstichprobe”, EVS). The EVS is maintained by the German Fed-
eral Statistical Oﬃce (“Statistisches Bundesamt”, StaBu). Households are recruited voluntarily
for reports every ﬁve years, according to stratiﬁed quota samples from Germany’s current pop-
ulation census (“Mikrozensus”). They are aggregated to the population according to a marginal
distribution of demographic characteristics. The entire population covered by the EVS is re-
5Moreover, the tax-free allowance for income from agriculture and forestry (§13 Abs.3 EStG) was reduced
from 1,023 euros in 1998 to 670 euros in 2005. Simultaneously to the year 2000 tax reform, adjustments at
the child beneﬁt and the child allowance (“Familienleistungsausgleich”) were undertaken. In 2005, a reform
of the taxation of old-age pension income was undertaken (“Alterseinkünftegesetz”). These adjustments shall
not be considered in the analysis at hand.
6This implies that the ﬁscal budget is unbalanced in the short run through the reform. For the long run, it
can be assumed that the ﬁscal budget is to be balanced so that the income gains through the reform could
be partly (or entirely) drawn back from the households, also see the discussion in Section 4. In fact, the
major ﬁnancing elements of the reform were meant to be adjustments of depreciation rules for companies’
assets, which are though not considered here (Bundesministerium der Finanzen, 2004).
6stricted, as there are groups that are not covered: institutionalized people (i.e. military people
in caserns, students in dormitories, elderly and disabled people in nursery homes or hospi-
tals, nurses or migrant workers in residences, people in jails), homeless people, and households
with monthly net household income greater than 35,000 DM (i.e. about 18,000 euros). For the
1998 cross section applied here, the scientiﬁc use ﬁle (80% samples) contains 49,720 households
(42,744 for 2003). For details on how the data set has been manipulated, see Ochmann (2010).
3.2 Reform Evaluation
The ﬁrst aim of this analysis is to evaluate distributional eﬀects of Germany’s year 2000 tax
reform. Distributional eﬀects may occur because households’ incomes are aﬀected to a varying
degree by the reform depending on taxable income. In order to quantify these eﬀects, house-
holds’ disposable equivalent income before and after the reform shall be compared, where the
modiﬁed OECD equivalence scale and a size-adjusting function are applied.7 As households
are observed in the data only for the pre-reform year, 1998, and not for the post-reform year,
2005, the changes in the tax function related to the reform need to be simulated.
The reform is thus evaluated in an ex-ante analysis. The tax reform was implemented between
the years 1998 and 2005, but data are currently available only for the years 1998 and 2003.8
Pre-reform tax law is simulated as of the time of 1998, and post-reform tax law is simulated
as of the time of 2005. The simulations are undertaken with the help of an income taxation
module, which is brieﬂy introduced in the following. Thereafter, a model for household asset
demand is described, which is then applied to estimate welfare eﬀects.
7The modiﬁed OECD equivalence scale attaches a weight of 1.0 to the household head, a weight of 0.5 to
every other household member older than 14, and a weight of 0.3 to every remaining household member
younger than 14. It determines the equivalent income function applied. In addition, the size-adjusting
function speciﬁes the weight attached to each household according to its composition. Here, size adjustment
by needs is applied, i.e. technically, incomes are divided by the equivalence scale and resulting equivalent
incomes are in turn weighted by the equivalence scale. See Ebert and Moyes (2003) for the concept of
needs-adjusted equivalence scaling and Bönke and Schröder (2010) for an application to country inequality
rankings. It is moreover debatable if other income concepts are more appropriate in the context of this
analysis. Alternatively, the income concept that underlies the consumption-savings decision could be applied
here. Further research shall investigate sensitivity of the results w.r.t. alternative income concepts.
8As households are also observed for the in-between-reform year, 2003, in another cross-section, a mixture of
ex-ante and ex-post analysis would be possible. The 2003 data could be used for an ex-post evaluation of
the ﬁrst step of the reform, which was implemented in 2001. This shall be undertaken in future research
together with an ex-post evaluation of the entire reform once micro data from the 2008 cross-section are
available.
7Simulation
In order to evaluate distributional eﬀects of the reform, income taxation is simulated for the
pre-reform year as well as for the post-reform year based on the income taxation module that is
described in Ochmann (2010). In the module, the changes at the tax function that are related
to the reform, as described in Section 2, are implemented. It is set up in the framework of a
classical static microsimulation model of household savings and asset demand, either including
or excluding behavioral responses.9 Behavioral responses related to savings and asset demand
are derived from estimated asset demand elasticities.
At the simulation, the commonly observed eﬀect of “bracket creep” (see e.g. Saez, 2003), that
is related to inﬂation and progressive elements in the tariﬀ, is accounted for. The tax tariﬀ in
German income tax law is related to incomes in nominal terms and not indexed to inﬂation.
Thus, taxpayers that are close to the upper bound of a tax bracket may creep up to a higher
bracket in case of rising nominal incomes, while their real incomes may stay constant if the
increase barely compensates inﬂation. They then face a higher marginal tax rate, while their
incomes in real terms are constant. In order to account for the eﬀect of “bracket creep”, it is
assumed that gross incomes in real terms are constant between 1998 and 2005, i.e. real gross
wages are also constant. Increases in nominal incomes thus barely compensate inﬂation.10
Technically, taxable incomes in 1998 prices are inﬂated by the CPI11 to 2005 prices for the
simulation of the post-reform tariﬀ and then deﬂated back to 1998 prices when comparing
pre-reform incomes to post-reform incomes for the evaluation of distributional income eﬀects.12
Following the basic set up of a static microsimulation model, the analysis is conducted in a
partial equilibrium framework of comparative statics. It is assumed that pre-tax asset market
prices are in equilibrium and thus are not aﬀected by demand changes. This implies that asset
supply is perfectly elastic, so that the only eﬀects considered result from demand shifts that
are related to changes in taxation of asset returns. Moreover, eﬀects on other markets than
9For a survey on behavioral microsimulation models in the context of public redistribution policies, see Bour-
guignon and Spadaro (2006).
10Real gross wages were largely constant over the period of 1998 to 2005 in East- as well as West-Germany, see
Brenke (2009).
11Compound inﬂation measured by CPI diﬀerentials amounts to 10.5% for West-Germany and 9.2% for East-
Germany in the post-reform year 2005 compared to the pre-reform year 1998.
12It is generally debatable if it is appropriate to account for the eﬀect of “bracket creep” here. The idea of this
approach is to measure the reform-related reduction of the tax burden in real terms. The assumptions made
for this approach appear to be reasonable. It could, however, also be argued that there is more heterogeneity
in the inﬂation eﬀects over this time frame, e.g. in wages over the industries, that remains uncaptured, or
that the households will have to be compensated for the eﬀect of “bracket creep” in the long run and thus
the tax tariﬀ be adjusted. This would rather speak for neglecting its eﬀects in this analysis. First-round
eﬀects are found to be 45% greater for this alternative approach, see Section 4.
8the asset market are not considered here.13 Thus, also labor supply eﬀects are not considered
here. In Section 4, it is discussed how this might aﬀect the results. In the following, a model
for household asset demand will be brieﬂy introduced.
A Model for Household Asset Demand
Another aim of this analysis is to evaluate welfare eﬀects of Germany’s year 2000 tax reform that
are related to household reactions concerning savings behavior and asset demand. Households
may be induced by the reform to adjust intertemporal consumption decisions as well as decisions
to allocate given savings to various types of assets. These demand eﬀects are twofold. On the
one hand, there is an income eﬀect, as the reform aﬀects disposable household income through
the tariﬀ shift. On the other hand, there is a substitution eﬀect, as the reform alters relative
asset prices by the shift and additionally by changes in taxation schemes and allowances related
to capital income. In order to determine whether households, in addition to the income eﬀect,
gain or lose utility by substituting relatively more expensive assets for relatively less expensive
ones, household preferences for assets shall be estimated.
In order to estimate households’ preferences for consumption and savings as well as for
allocation of savings to types of assets, household asset demand is modeled in a structural
system for asset demand. For that purpose, asset demand is embedded in a two-stage budgeting
model (2SBM) and modeled in a linearized quadratic almost ideal demand system (QUAIDS),
as it is described in detail in Ochmann (2010) and shall thus be introduced here only brieﬂy.
In that model, households maximize utility that is generated from a stream of service ﬂows
provided by the assets.14 The budget is allocated to assets in clusters at two stages. Let sij
denote the share from the respective budget in cluster l that household i invests in asset j. Then
asset demand in the QUAIDS is represented by the following system of j = 1;:::;J demand
share equations, where J denotes the number of all asset types available to the household:
sij = 0j + 1j ln(Ail=P






for households i = 1;:::;N, assets j = 1;:::;J and clusters l = 1;:::;L. Ail is household i’s
budget for cluster l, pik the price of asset k for household i, and 0j an asset-speciﬁc constant.
1j and 2j denote parameters of the budget eﬀects and jk a parameter of relative price
changes. ln(P ) is the translog price index, which is approximated by a linear price index, the
13For a study of eﬀects of tax reforms on asset prices and other markets in a general equilibrium framework,
see inter alia Hall (1996).
14Service ﬂows of an asset may involve the return to investment, risk-related attributes, transaction-related
characteristics, and other asset-speciﬁc services.
9log-linear Laspeyres index (ln(P ) =
P
j  sj ln( pj)), resulting in the linearized QUAIDS.
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where  sk is the average share of asset k and jk is the Kronecker delta, i.e. jk = 1 if j = k and
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For the sake of interpretation, compensated (after-tax) rate-of-return elasticities rather than














j (1   tij)   i is the after-tax real rate of return to asset j, r
gro
j the respective
pre-tax return, i is the inﬂation rate relevant for household i, and tij the marginal tax rate
on capital income from asset j that is simulated in the income taxation module described in
the previous subsection. The uncompensated rate-of-return elasticity follows accordingly from
Eq. (3). Total asset demand in this model is deﬁned as the sum of accumulations of each asset.
This deﬁnition for total demand excludes asset liquidations in order to deﬁne asset shares
consistently in Eq. (1). Thus, total asset demand can be interpreted as gross savings, in terms
of expenditures for asset accumulations.15 For more details on the model, see Ochmann (2010).
Measuring Distributional and Welfare Eﬀects
If the tax reform induces households to reallocate their assets due to an income eﬀect and
shifts in relative asset prices, there may occur changes in household utility additionally to the
distributional eﬀects of income gains or losses. In order to quantify the excess burden of distor-
tionary taxation of asset accumulation following the concept of consumer surplus, an estimate
15When estimated eﬀects are summed up to aggregate asset demand in Section 4, eﬀects on asset liquidations
are inferred from simplifying assumptions, so that conclusions can also be drawn on net savings. Liquidations
are though not integrated into the model.
10for households’ preferences concerning consumption and savings as well as the allocation of sav-
ings to asset types is required. In the analysis at hand, the underlying preferences are inferred
from estimates for asset demand functions from the microeconomic model. Diﬀerences in util-
ity are approximated by areas under the compensated (Hicksian) demand functions from the
asset demand model, which is in line with the concept of consumer surplus.16 The structural
demand system in Eq.(1) allows for between-asset substitution, so that compensated price (or
rate-of-return) elasticities can be estimated.
Following the concept of consumer surplus, welfare eﬀects of distortionary taxation can be
quantiﬁed by a popular welfare measure, the compensating variation (CV ). The compensating
variation is a money-metric measure that yields welfare eﬀects in actual cash sums. It is deﬁned
by the integral under the Hicksian demand curve, for a constant pre-reform utility level. The
compensating variation can thus be interpreted as the cash sum by which a household would
have to be compensated for a price increase – after the reform, i.e. at post-reform prices – in
order to gain a constant pre-reform utility level.17 Following the welfare-concept deﬁnition, the












i) is the cost function for expenditures of household i to gain the post-reform
utility level at post-reform prices, and c(u0
i;p1
i) the respective cost function to gain the pre-
reform utility level at post-reform prices. If this diﬀerence is strictly greater than zero, the
household is better oﬀ after the reform in money-metric welfare terms.
As diﬀerences in utility are not observed, the CV needs to be approximated with the help of
estimates for the compensated price elasticities in Eq.(4).18 A second-order Taylor expansion
of c(u0;p1) around (u0;p0) yields, omitting household indices for simplicity (see Deaton and



































where c(u0;p0) is the cost function for the pre-reform utility level at pre-reform prices.
16As Hicksian demand functions are ﬁrst derivatives of the cost function, integration over the interval of a price
change yields diﬀerences in costs of reaching the same indiﬀerence curve at two distinct price vectors (see
Deaton and Muellbauer, 1980, pp.184-186).
17However, the equivalent variation is the cash sum a household would be willing to pay in order to avoid the
price increase – before the reform, i.e. at pre-reform prices – to gain a constant post-reform utility level. For
a comparison to other welfare measures in the context of tax reforms and an application to a speciﬁc reform
of the subsidization of housing assets in the UK, see e.g. King (1983).
18Note that here price elasticities must be applied to approximate the expenditures in Eq.(6).
11Rewriting the deﬁnition of the CV in Eq.(6) and using Eq.(7), the CV of a combined price
and income change can be approximated by estimates for the compensated price elasticities
(see Appendix A for a detailed derivation):19
































where b " c
jk is an estimate for the compensated price elasticity of asset j w.r.t. price of asset
k.20 Eq.(8) contains only variables that are observed or that have been estimated, while all
utility terms have been replaced. In case demand is completely inelastic for all assets, there
are no distortionary eﬀects, i.e. b " c
jk = 0 8j;k = 1;:::;J, and the CV reduces to the income
changes added to the changes in expenditures for constant demand resulting from the price












. This is denoted in the literature as ﬁrst-order
approximation to the welfare measure (Banks et al., 1996).21
If the single utility changes are accumulated to an aggregate welfare measure, a normative
assumption concerning the relative valuation of the individual households is required. One
normative assumption is implied here by weighting the welfare eﬀects with the modiﬁed OECD
equivalence scale, i.e. accounting for eﬀects of household composition and adjusting for diﬀer-
ences in needs. Apart from that, it is assumed that the social welfare function is utilitarian,
i.e. all households get the same social utility weight, so that the welfare eﬀects in equivalent
money-metric terms are eﬀectively added up over all households and average eﬀects are evalu-
ated.22 Results on estimated elasticities and welfare eﬀects together with distributional income
eﬀects are presented in the next section.
19In simulations with log-linear utility, this approximation performed accurately in case the diﬀerentials in pre-
and post-reform prices are of similar size and the same sign for all assets. In case, the variation in the
diﬀerentials is not too large, the approximation error appeared to be acceptable. For further simulations on
the approximation error, also see Banks et al. (1996).
20Note that these are average elasticities over all households. Their application in the welfare measure implies
the assumption of equal social utility weights for all households (see Banks et al., 1996).
21Generally, there is a trade oﬀ regarding accuracy between such a ﬁrst-order approximation and a second-order
approximation of the form in Eq.(8). The latter is on the one hand found to produce lower approximation
error in speciﬁc empirical applications (Banks et al., 1996). On the other hand, it gives rise to potential
imprecision or even bias from the estimation of substitution elasticities in demand, which is not needed for
ﬁrst-order approximations. In Section 5, implications for further research are directed to the investigation
which approximation is the most appropriate for the application at hand.
22Alternatively, social utility weights could vary over the households, and inequality aversion could be intro-
duced. This would put a higher weight on households with relatively lower income and a lower weight on
households with relatively higher income. The results in Section 4 indicate that such weighting would reduce
the aggregate welfare eﬀects of the reform, as welfare eﬀects increase by income and they are even slightly
negative in the lower income deciles. The results found for the utilitarian welfare function shall be compared
to welfare eﬀects for an income-weighted welfare function in future research. The weights applied shall be
made consistent with the applied income concept, as discussed earlier.
124 Results
This section is partitioned into four parts. Firstly, ﬁrst-round distributional eﬀects of the reform
are presented. They refer solely to the income eﬀects and neglect any household behavioral
response. Secondly, eﬀects of households’ demand reactions on savings and asset demand are
featured.23 From all these eﬀects, resulting second-round distributional eﬀects are derived.
Finally, utility losses resulting from behavioral adjustments are quantiﬁed and evaluated in
terms of welfare eﬀects.
4.1 First-Round Distributional Eﬀects
Distributional eﬀects are related to cash gains (or losses) that result from the tax reform.
They are relevant if the gains are distributed unequally over the households, e.g. if disposable
income increases relatively stronger through the reform for households in higher tax brackets
than for households in lower brackets. This is the case here, primarily because the tax function
is progressive, so that the gains will have an eﬀect on inequality in the income distribution.
Distributional eﬀects shall be decomposed into ﬁrst-round and second-round eﬀects depending
on whether behavioral adjustment of savings and asset demand is taken into account or not.
While ﬁrst-round eﬀects consist only of immediate income changes for ﬁxed demand, second-
round eﬀects additionally consider income changes in the form of capital income diﬀerentials
resulting from demand adjustments. Income changes are evaluated for pre-reform and post-
reform diﬀerentials in disposable equivalent household income.
Changes in the income distribution shall be evaluated with several popular inequality mea-
sures. The general entropy index, GE(-1), is relatively more sensitive to changes at the lower
end of the income distribution. The Gini coeﬃcient is sensitive to income changes in the middle
of the distribution. The Theil index, GE(1), is more than average sensitive to income shifts at
the top of the distribution (see e.g. Ochmann and Peichl, 2006). Deﬁnitions of the indices are
relegated to Appendix A.
Germany’s year 2000 tax reform aﬀects the distribution of disposable household income di-
rectly by shifting the tax tariﬀ and broadening the tax base. These eﬀects shall be measured
by comparing the distribution of pre-reform equivalent income with the distribution of sim-
ulated post-reform equivalent income. Table 1 presents results for ﬁrst-round distributional
eﬀects of the tax reform, where the eﬀects of “bracket creep” are accounted for. Pre-reform
and post-reform disposable equivalent household incomes in pre-reform prices and absolute as
well as relative income diﬀerentials are displayed in the upper panel of Table 1. First-round
23However, by the partial equilibrium assumption, there are no third-round eﬀects of changes in market prices
on asset demand analyzed here, as pre-tax asset prices are assumed unaﬀected by the reform.
13income gains, deﬁned by diﬀerentials in pre-reform and post-reform income, are reported for
equivalent as well as non-equivalent incomes – i.e. the latter are not adjusted for diﬀerences in
needs – while relative gains are reported only for the former.
Table 1: First-Round Distributional Eﬀects by Taxable Income (in euros per year)
Upper Pre-Reform Post-Reform   
Dec.Bound Eqv.Income Eqv.Income (eqv.) (non-eqv.) (%)
Deciles of Tax.Inc.
1 675 13,548 13,548 0 0 0.00
2 1,585 13,961 13,962 1 2 0.01
3 2,808 16,144 16,148 4 5 0.03
4 7,084 17,149 17,202 53 75 0.31
5 11,376 17,012 17,352 340 556 2.00
6 14,758 17,925 18,420 495 872 2.76
7 18,509 20,009 20,607 598 1,049 2.99
8 22,782 22,847 23,550 703 1,151 3.08
9 29,465 26,169 26,963 794 1,234 3.03
10 191,714 39,006 40,371 1,365 2,037 3.50
Region
West-Germany 21,586 22,079 493 745 2.28
East-Germany 16,237 16,559 322 495 1.99
Average Household 20,576 21,037 461 698 2.24
Gini 0.2704 0.2728 0.0024 0.90
Giniwest 0.2717 0.2739 0.0022 0.82
Ginieast 0.2206 0.2239 0.0033 1.48
GE(-1) 0.1285 0.1319 0.0034 2.59
GE(-1)west 0.1320 0.1352 0.0032 2.44
GE(-1)east 0.0844 0.0874 0.0030 3.47
Theil 0.1236 0.1261 0.0025 2.03
Theilwest 0.1238 0.1262 0.0024 1.93
Theileast 0.0852 0.0875 0.0023 2.78
Notes: Deciles refer to pre-reform taxable household income. Pre-reform and post-reform disposable incomes are needs
adjusted by the modiﬁed OECD equivalence scale, see fn. 7 for details.  (eqv.) is the diﬀerential in pre-reform and post-
reform disposable equivalent incomes,  (non-eqv.) the respective diﬀerential in non-equivalent incomes.  (%) denotes
the diﬀerentials in relative terms and is identical for the two concepts. All incomes are in pre-reform (1998) prices. “Gini” is
the Gini coeﬃcient, “GE(-1)” the general entropy index, and “Theil” the Theil index, GE(1), all as deﬁned in Appendix A.
Number of observations is N = 49;484. Data weighted by population weights (36.5 mn. households in the population).
Source: Own calculations using the EVS data (1998).
An average household gains 461 euros per year in equivalent terms by ﬁrst-round eﬀects of
the reform, which corresponds to 2.24% of pre-reform disposable equivalent household income.
This gain corresponds to 698 euros in non-equivalent income. It becomes apparent that this
gain is distributed unequally over the deciles of taxable income. While households in the three
14lowest deciles gain on average virtually zero by the reform, the gain increases absolutely as well
as relatively from, in equivalent terms, 53 euros in the fourth decile to 1,365 euros in the tenth
decile (from 0.31% to 3.50%).24 This ﬁnding indicates that the reform has a regressive eﬀect, as
high incomes gain relatively more by the reform than low incomes. This eﬀect results primarily
from the substantial reduction of marginal tax rates and is apparently not fully compensated
by the broadening of the tax base.25
As a consequence, income inequality increases by the reform. In the lower panel of Table 1,
results for various inequality measures for pre-reform and post-reform incomes are presented,
for all households in Germany as well as diﬀerentiated by East- and West-Germany. The Gini
coeﬃcient of disposable equivalent income for Germany slightly increases by the ﬁrst-round
eﬀects of the reform from 0.2704 to 0.2728 (i.e. by 0.90%). The Gini coeﬃcient is relatively
more sensitive in the mid-levels of the income distribution. A stronger increase is found for the
general entropy index, which rises for Germany by 2.59%, and for the Theil index, which rises
by 2.03%. These results indicate that the increase in income inequality is largely related to
the lower end as well as the higher end of the distribution, while leaving mid-level incomes less
aﬀected. Higher incomes beneﬁt greatly from the reduction of tax rates, while lower incomes
beneﬁt greatly from the increasing tax-exempt allowance. Mid-level incomes are relatively less
aﬀected by these two main reform elements.
Generally, ﬁrst-round income gains are greater in West- than in East-Germany, in absolute
as well as in relative terms. While in West-Germany an average household gains 493 euros
(which corresponds to 2.28% of pre-reform disposable equivalent household income in West-
Germany), an average household in East-Germany gains only 322 euros (1.99%). Moreover,
inequality increases more strongly in East-Germany than in West-Germany. While the Gini
coeﬃcient increases for West-Germany by 0.82%, it increases for East-Germany slightly stronger
by 1.48%. Also the increase in the general entropy index as well as the Theil index is relatively
stronger in East-Germany.26
24While for 69% of the households in the population, ﬁrst-round eﬀects are positive, for some 8%, they are
negative, and some 23% are unaﬀected, as long as demand adjustments are not considered. Households
are unaﬀected by the reform in the ﬁrst round if their pre-reform taxable income is below the tax-exempt
allowance and no other changes apply. If in addition other changes related to the broadening of the tax base
apply or to the eﬀect of “bracket creep”, households may actually lose.
25The ﬁnding of a regressive eﬀect of the reform is in line with Haan and Steiner (2005), Corneo (2005), and
Bönke and Corneo (2006). Maiterth and Müller (2009) further qualify this result in the context of tax equity
applying a measure for the distribution of the tax burden and ﬁnd that increasing income inequality does
not necessarily allow the conclusion that the reform increased tax inequity.
26All results presented refer to the reform simulation accounting for “bracket creep”. If “bracket creep” were
not accounted for, the income gain for an average household would increase to 669 euros in equivalent terms
(3.25% of pre-reform income; 45% greater than under “bracket creep”), and the post-reform Gini coeﬃcient
(0.2744) would also be slightly greater compared to the main results. The increase in the income gain
through the omission of “bracket creep” is found to be greater in relative terms for low incomes. Moreover,
15The results found here are qualitatively and quantitatively similar to what Haan and Steiner
(2005) ﬁnd for distributional eﬀects of the reform in case labor supply adjustment is not ac-
counted for. Haan and Steiner (2005) report a slightly greater Gini coeﬃcient for pre-reform
incomes using SOEP data. This is on the one hand due to a diﬀerent income concept (net
income vs. disposable equivalent income), and on the other hand to a diﬀerent base year (2000
vs.1998).27 The average income gain through the reform found by Haan and Steiner (2005) is
somewhat greater than found here: 725 euros or 2.80% of net income in case “bracket creep” is
accounted for. Due to a diﬀerent income concept, these results are, if at all, only comparable
in relative terms to the results found here. The diﬀerence in relative terms is most probably
due to the lack of top-incomes in the EVS data; in the SOEP data, these are accounted for by
an additional high income sample.28
Comparability of the distributional eﬀects found here to results found by Wagenhals (2001)
is limited, as Wagenhals (2001) only reports second-round eﬀects considering labor supply
reactions. Nevertheless, results for evolution of inequality are similar: the gain of the reform is
relatively greater for higher incomes compared to lower incomes and thus inequality increases;
the Gini coeﬃcient for disposable household income is found to rise by 2.70% in Wagenhals
(2001). The eﬀects also correspond qualitatively to the results from Merz and Zwick (2002).
They ﬁnd an average gain of 6.90% from 1995 disposable household income and an increase
in the Gini coeﬃcient of 1.80%. Comparison to their results is though also limited, as Merz
and Zwick (2002) additionally consider changes at the local business tax, whereby the gain for
entrepreneurs is greater, and they do not account for “bracket creep”.
4.2 Eﬀects on Asset Demand
The results discussed so far neglect households’ responses in savings and asset demand to the
reform. Germany’s year 2000 tax reform may though induce households to adjust their savings
and asset allocation behavior. On the one hand, the increase in disposable income from ﬁrst-
round eﬀects of the reform may be allocated to current and postponed consumption diﬀerently
if the shift in the tariﬀ were entirely omitted from the reform, inequality would actually decrease solely due
to the broadening of the tax base. Thus, the increase in inequality through the entire reform can be traced
back to the tariﬀ shift alone.
27Generally, income inequality slightly increased during 1998 and 2000 in Germany (Bach, Corneo, and Steiner,
2009). Moreover, as Becker, Frick, Grabka, Hauser, Krause, and Wagner (2003) point out, net incomes on
average are slightly greater and income inequality is slightly lower in the EVS data than in the SOEP data.
Though, for 1998 data, this result is based on SOEP data that do not include a high income sample, as it is
included in Haan and Steiner (2005). A similar Gini coeﬃcient for net equivalent household income in 1998
using EVS data is found by Becker et al. (2003) as well as by Merz (2001).
28In order to account for the diﬀerent distributions of the top incomes in these two micro data sets, the
population weights of the EVS data could be regenerated according to the income distribution in the SOEP
data. This shall be conducted in future research.
16than the pre-reform disposable income is allocated. On the other hand, relative net prices
of assets are altered by the reduction of marginal tax rates and the broadening of the tax
base, as returns to some assets are taxable while others are tax exempt and as some assets are
aﬀected by adjustments of allowances, while others are not. As a consequence, diﬀerentials in
pre-reform and post-reform net asset prices vary over the assets. While for some assets, the
net price falls due to the decreasing tax rates, net prices increase for other assets primarily due
to reductions of allowances.
Diﬀerentials in Net Asset Prices
As stated earlier, pre-tax asset market prices are assumed to be unaﬀected by household asset
demand reactions resulting from the reform. Changes in after-tax asset prices at the household
level are thus directly related to the elements of the reform that aﬀect taxation of asset returns.
These changes vary over the households according to the tax bracket as well as over the asset
types. Table 2 displays in the third column changes in relative terms in net asset prices related
to the reform for an average household.
Net prices fall on average signiﬁcantly for non-owner-occupied housing assets (by 1.45%)
because lower tax rates increase the returns to income from renting and leasing which is fully
taxable, oﬀsetting a decrease of returns to speculative trading that results from the fact that
the time frame for tax exemption of price arbitrage sales was increased from two to ten years
for non-owner-occupied housing assets. Net prices also fall on average slightly for mortgage
repayments (0.03%), for bonds (<0.00%), for bank deposits (<0.00%), and for building-society
deposits (<0.00%). For all these assets, this is primarily related to the decrease in tax rates
which slightly increases net asset returns and oﬀsets the decrease in the tax-exempt allowance
on capital income.29 For bonds, the tax eﬀect additionally oﬀsets a return-diminishing eﬀect
from increasing the time frame for tax exemption of price arbitrage sales of equities from six
months to twelve months.
Net prices increase, however, on average signiﬁcantly for stocks (2.31%). Changing the
system of taxation of dividends from the imputation scheme to the half-income scheme reduces
net stock returns, as corporate taxes can no longer be credited against personal income tax.30
29Note that mortgage repayments are treated as an asset here. In the German income tax law, they are tax
deductible if they are related to non-owner-occupied housing. If marginal tax rates are lowered, deducting
such mortgage repayments becomes less attractive and in turn increasing repayments more attractive. For
more details on the deﬁnition of asset prices in the demand model, see Ochmann (2010).
30Deutsches Aktieninstitut (2000) shows that net returns to stocks are lower in the half-income scheme up to a
marginal tax rate of 40%. Moreover, they argue that gross returns to stocks are also reduced by the foregone
corporate-tax credit. The latter result indicates that the partial equilibrium assumption could be violated
here. It suggests that there could be relevant third-round eﬀects of the reform on the demand for stocks
that are not subject to analysis in this study.
17Table 2: Estimated Demand Elasticities and Demand Diﬀerentials in Aggregate Sums
Elasticities Price Aggregate Demand (bn. euros per year)
Budget Own-Rate Delta Gross Net
(b jjl)a (b "
(r)u
jj ) (%) (Pre-Ref.) gross % (Pre-Ref.) net
Savings 1:84 0:11  0:20 457:25 17:59 3:85 124:37 4:24
Housing Assets 1:27 1:01  0:12 157:65 6:65 4:22 74:97 3:19
Financial Assets 0:94 1:79 0:58 299:61 10:95 3:65 52:35 1:05
Owner-Occupied 1:26 1:14 0:02 56:38 2:84 5:03 52:10 2:62
Non-Owner-Occ. 1:43 1:20  1:45 26:46 1:47 5:56 22:63 1:26
Mortgage Rep. 0:92 1:42  0:03 74:81 2:34 3:12  22:13  0:69
Bank Deposits 1:28 1:18  0:00 164:30 6:85 4:17  9:61  0:40
Building-Soc. D. 0:82 0:60  0:00 36:00 0:83 2:31 19:37 0:45
Stocks 1:62  0:14 2:31 47:24 1:92 4:05 18:42 0:75
Bonds 1:88  0:61  0:00 7:18 0:34 4:67  1:70  0:08
Insurances 0:41 1:26 1:03 20:25 0:36 1:78 10:19 0:18
Credit Rep. 0:87 0:80 0:00 24:63 0:65 2:65 5:81 0:15
Notes: Signiﬁcance levels based on standard errors computed by the delta method: *p < 0:10, **p < 0:05, ***p < 0:01.
Elasticities are computed at the mean of all covariates. b jjl is the point estimate for the conditional budget elasticity on asset
levels. The condition is on the respective cluster budget in the 2SBM, see Ochmann (2010). b "
(r)u
jj is the point estimate for the
unconditional uncompensated own-rate of return elasticity. Price delta (%) is the post-reform to pre-reform relative change
in after-tax asset prices. Gross aggregate asset demand refers to asset accumulations, whereas net demand is the balance of
accumulations and liquidations.
a: Null hypothesis for the budget elasticities is b jjl = 1.
Source: Own calculations using the EVS data (1998, 2003).
In addition, the decrease in the tax-exempt allowance on capital income lowers net returns
to dividends for the shareholder. These eﬀects largely oﬀset the eﬀects of lower personal tax
rates for an average household. Net prices also increase for contributions to capital and private
old-age pension insurances (1.03%), as these were still fully tax deductible by the year of 1998,
so that their net return decreases if tax rates are lowered. The after-tax price increases only
slightly through the reform for owner-occupied housing (0.02%). On the one hand, this price
decreases because the time frame for tax exemption of price arbitrage sales for owner-occupied
housing assets of two years was abolished, and income from such sales is generally tax exempt
after the reform. On the other hand, the net price for owner-occupied housing increases because
allowances for deduction of initial costs for buying a house were abolished by the reform, see
Section 2. Net prices are invariant for consumer credit repayments as these are not subject to
income taxation, meaning in this context, they can not be deducted from taxable income.
As a result, the after-tax price for housing assets in general slightly decreases on average
(0.12%), while the price for ﬁnancial assets in general increases on average (0.58%). Finally,
18this lets the net price for savings in general decrease slightly by 0.20%.31 This price decrease
induces households to substitute consumption for savings, as will be derived from the demand
model in the following. Moreover, households have incentives to substitute relatively more
expensive assets for relatively cheaper assets due to the shifts in relative asset prices.
Asset Demand Responses
As a consequence of the partial equilibrium assumption, savings and asset demand responses
follow directly from the asset demand model presented in Section 3. For methodological issues
concerning its estimation, see Ochmann (2010). Estimates for budget and price elasticities
determine the eﬀects of the ﬁrst-round income gains and the relative asset price changes on
savings and asset demand. There results post-reform asset demand. Estimates for conditional
budget elasticities are compiled in the ﬁrst column and for uncompensated unconditional own-
rate elasticities, in the second column of Table 2, both for demand levels.32
As the ﬁrst column of Table 2 reveals, savings are found to be elastic w.r.t. income (b jjl = 1:84).
Thus, an increase in disposable income of 2.16% by ﬁrst-round eﬀects of the reform will induce
households to increase their savings by about 3.98%, let alone demand reactions that are related
to price shifts.33 As a consequence, an average household increases annual gross asset demand
by 396 euros if disposable income in non-equivalent terms increases by 698 euros through
ﬁrst-round eﬀects of the reform. If it is further considered that demand for asset liquidations
(dissavings) in the data amounts on average to about 73% of the demand for accumulations,
there results an increase of annual net savings by 107 euros for an average household.34
So far, these results relate solely to the income eﬀect. Households moreover increase savings
due to a decreasing price for savings in conjunction with a positive estimate for the uncompen-
sated own-rate elasticity (second column of Table 2). Additionally to the 107 euros from the
income eﬀect, an average household increases annual net savings by 23 euros due to a decrease
31This decrease in the savings price corresponds to an increase in the rate of the return of about 0.20 percentage
points, e.g. from 5.0% to 5.2%. Moreover, the prices computed here for the asset clusters are compound price
indices, generated as weighted averages over the prices of the underlying asset types, where the weights are
sample-average shares of the portfolio of asset holdings which are exogenous to the asset allocation decision.
By a composition eﬀect, the decrease in the price for savings is stronger here than the decrease in the price
for housing assets. For details, see Ochmann (2010).
32The corresponding budget elasticities on the shares follow from: b share
jjl = b level
jjl   1. More results can be
found in Ochmann (2010).
33This budget elasticity is estimated in Beznoska and Ochmann (2010). Its size is almost identical w.r.t. current
and permanent income. Thus, the results presented here could be interpreted as valid for the short term as
well as for the long term.
34This implies the assumption that the relation between asset accumulations and asset liquidations is not
aﬀected by the reform. This is probably a strong assumption, and it shall be loosened in future research
once the decision to liquidate assets is integrated into the demand model.
19in the savings price of about 0.20%, so that altogether, annual net savings are increased by
130 euros if disposable income increases by 698 euros through ﬁrst-round eﬀects of the reform
(Table 1). This implies a marginal savings rate of 18:6% at the household level. Eﬀects on the
aggregate savings rate will be analyzed in the next subsection.
These additional savings are then at a ﬁrst stage further allocated to housing assets and
ﬁnancial assets, where demand for the former is elastic (b jjl = 1:27, ﬁrst column of Table 2)
and for the latter inelastic (0.94) w.r.t. the budget. Among housing assets, demand is further
elastic for owner-occupied (1.26) as well as non-owner-occupied housing (1.43) and inelastic
for mortgage repayments (0.92). Among ﬁnancial assets, demand is elastic for bank deposits
(1.28), stocks (1.62), and bonds (1.88), and inelastic for building society deposits (0.82), life and
private-pension insurances (0.41), and consumer credit repayments (0.87). Demand for almost
all assets increases if the own return increases, which is consistent with a negative semi-deﬁnite
Slutsky matrix from demand theory. Only for stocks, the estimate for the uncompensated
own-rate elasticity is negative and for bonds, it is not signiﬁcantly diﬀerent from zero.35 The
estimates for the rate-of-return elasticities are discussed in more detail in Ochmann (2010).
Post-reform budgets together with post-reform prices then determine the allocation of the
ﬁrst-round income gains to the single assets in the demand model, which gives the post-reform
asset structure. The latter, together with post-reform real net returns to the single assets, de-
termines post-reform capital income, which in turn is aggregated over all assets at the household
level. Comparing post-reform capital income to pre-reform capital income, yields additional
income eﬀects of the reform. If these diﬀerentials in capital income are distributed unequally
over the households, additional distributional eﬀects may occur. These eﬀects added to the
ﬁrst-round eﬀects are compiled as second-round distributional eﬀects in Table 3. Firstly though,
eﬀects on aggregate savings, asset demand, and tax revenue shall be presented.
Eﬀects on Aggregate Asset Demand and on Tax Revenue
If the reactions in savings and asset demand at the household level are grossed up to the
population, eﬀects on the aggregate savings rate and on income tax revenue that are related to
the reform can be derived. As noted earlier, an average household increases annual net savings
by 130 euros if disposable income increases by 698 euros in non-equivalent terms through the
reform. In aggregate sums for the population, this corresponds to an increase in annual net
savings of private households by 4.24 bn. euros, from a pre-reform level of 124.37 bn. euros, as
Table 2 reveals in the last two columns. Relating this increase to the increase in disposable
35The negative estimate for the own-rate elasticity of stocks is potentially a problem in this analysis as it drives
the demand eﬀects for this asset, and this asset’s net price was signiﬁcantly altered by the reform. The
model shall thus be re-estimated in future research putting a constraint on this elasticity.
20income through the reform, which results here as 25.51 bn. euros aggregated to the population
of private households, the aggregate net savings rate increases by 0.17 percentage points, from
10.92% to 11.09%, by the reform.36
Aggregate demand shifts can moreover be analyzed diﬀerentiated by the single assets. Given
the pre-reform and post-reform price diﬀerentials together with the estimated demand elastic-
ities in the ﬁrst three columns of Table 2, households’ cumulated asset demand reactions can
be quantiﬁed. These aggregate sums in turn are compiled in columns four to eight of Table 2.
Columns four to six present the eﬀects on aggregate asset accumulations, i.e. gross demand,
that can be directly inferred from the estimates for the demand model. It becomes apparent
that accumulations increase for each asset due to a dominant budget eﬀect from the ﬁrst-round
income gains. The increase is relatively stronger for assets with a relatively stronger income
elasticity or for assets for which relative prices fall by the reform. This is the case for housing
assets in general, for non-owner-occupied housing, for bank deposits, and for bonds. Accumu-
lations also increase relatively strongly for owner-occupied housing and for stocks, in spite of
rising prices.37 For all other assets, the increase in accumulations is lower than average.
If it is again assumed that the relation between accumulations and liquidations for each
asset is not aﬀected by the reform, accumulations can be netted out against liquidations and
eﬀects of the reform on net asset demand can be quantiﬁed. These are presented in the last
two columns of Table 2. As a result of the assumption of a constant liquidation rate, demand
increases in net terms only for these assets, for which accumulations exceed liquidations already
before the reform. However, for mortgage repayments, for bank deposits, and for bonds, net
demand is further reduced slightly by the reform. The major loadings of the increase in net
savings by 4.24 bn. euros are related to owner-occupied housing assets (2.62 bn. euros) and to
non-owner-occupied housing assets (1.26).
The reform moreover results in a reduction in the income tax revenue. Based on the mi-
cro data, aggregate income tax revenue from the pre-reform tax function amounts to 172.77
bn. euros per year.38 This revenue is reduced by the reform, primarily due to the massive cuts
in the tax tariﬀ. The simulated post reform income tax revenue amounts to 147.25 bn. euros.
The reduction of 25.5 bn. euros per year (14.8% of pre-reform revenue) equals the aggregate in-
come gain for households in non-equivalent terms. It implies the change in the tariﬀ accounting
36The pre-reform aggregate net savings rate as well as the pre-reform level of aggregate net savings that are
found in the micro data are pretty close to the numbers reported from national accounts, i.e. 10.08% and
127.53 bn. euros, respectively (Statistisches Bundesamt, 2007). However, comparability of the micro with
the macro aggregates is limited due to conceptual reasons, also see Beznoska and Ochmann (2010).
37Note that for stocks, the eﬀect of an increasing asset price adds to the positive budget eﬀect, due to a negative
estimate for the own-rate elasticity.
38This aggregate income tax revenue is close to reported revenues from oﬃcial tax accounts, see Statistisches
Bundesamt (2004).
21for “bracket creep” and the broadening of the tax base accounting for households’ savings and
asset demand reactions. This result for the revenue loss comes pretty close to the annual 26.5
bn. euros estimated by the federal ministry of ﬁnance for revenue eﬀects of the reform that are
related to personal income taxation for the time frame of 1998 until 2005 (see Bundesminis-
terium der Finanzen, 2004; Keen, 2002). Bönke and Corneo (2006) report an annual reduction
of about 31 bn. euros for the same time frame. Haan and Steiner (2005) ﬁnd a reduction of
almost 36 bn. euros per year from a year-2000 income tax revenue level of 214 bn. euros in
case labor supply reactions are not accounted for. In relative terms, this amounts to a similar
reduction (16.8%) as found here.
4.3 Second-Round Distributional Eﬀects
If the eﬀects from the demand reactions discussed in the preceding subsection are considered
additionally the ﬁrst-round income gains, second-round income gains can be derived. These
gains imply the eﬀects of the increase in savings and the adjusted asset demand structure on
capital income – again accounting for the eﬀects of “bracket creep” from the tax tariﬀ. Results
for second-round distributional eﬀects are presented in Table 3. They are generally very similar
to the results for ﬁrst-round eﬀects.
An average household gains 458 euros per year in equivalent terms through the reform (2.23%
of pre-reform disposable equivalent income) when demand reactions are accounted for. This is
less than the ﬁrst-round income gains, where reactions are neglected, but the diﬀerence is with
3 euro per year in equivalent terms negligibly small. On the one hand, households substitute
assets that became relatively more expensive through the reform for relatively cheaper assets.
On the other hand, a strong income eﬀect dominates the substitution eﬀect for some relatively
more expensive assets, or it adds to it which is the case for stocks. The compound eﬀect over
all assets slightly reduces aggregate capital income for an average household.
This result holds for households in all upper deciles of the income distribution. While house-
holds in the ﬁrst four deciles are virtually unaﬀected by demand eﬀects, capital income losses
increase slightly in relative terms from the ﬁfth decile upwards. This progressive eﬀect of the
demand reactions, as a consequence, slightly attenuates the increase in income inequality. Com-
pared to the ﬁrst-round eﬀects, the increase in the Gini coeﬃcient for Germany is marginally
lower (0.88%), and also for the GE(-1) index as well as the Theil index, the increase is slightly
attenuated (2.54% and 1.98%, respectively). The eﬀects from demand reactions do not diﬀer
signiﬁcantly over the regions. As a result, inequality increases a bit more strongly in East- than
in West-Germany, which was already found from ﬁrst-round eﬀects. The second-round income
eﬀects are not yet the entire eﬀects of the tax reform. Income gains are reduced if utility losses
22Table 3: Second-Round Distributional Eﬀects by Taxable Income (in euros per year)
Upper Pre-Reform Post-Reform   
Dec.Bound Eqv.Income Eqv.Income (eqv.) (non-eqv.) (%)
Deciles of Tax.Inc.
1 675 13,548 13,548 0 0 0.00
2 1,585 13,961 13,962 1 2 0.01
3 2,808 16,144 16,148 4 5 0.03
4 7,084 17,149 17,202 53 75 0.31
5 11,376 17,012 17,351 339 554 1.99
6 14,758 17,925 18,418 493 869 2.75
7 18,509 20,009 20,605 596 1,045 2.98
8 22,782 22,847 23,547 700 1,146 3.06
9 29,465 26,169 26,958 789 1,227 3.02
10 191,714 39,006 40,357 1,351 2,017 3.47
Region
West-Germany 21,586 22,076 490 740 2.27
East-Germany 16,237 16,558 321 493 1.98
Average Household 20,576 21,034 458 694 2.23
Gini 0.2704 0.2728 0.0024 0.88
Giniwest 0.2717 0.2739 0.0022 0.79
Ginieast 0.2206 0.2238 0.0035 1.54
GE(-1) 0.1285 0.1318 0.0033 2.54
GE(-1)west 0.1320 0.1352 0.0032 2.39
GE(-1)east 0.0844 0.0873 0.0029 3.42
Theil 0.1236 0.1260 0.0024 1.98
Theilwest 0.1238 0.1261 0.0023 1.88
Theileast 0.0852 0.0875 0.0023 2.73
Notes: Deciles refer to pre-reform taxable household income. Pre-reform and post-reform disposable incomes are needs
adjusted by the modiﬁed OECD equivalence scale, see fn. 7 for details.  (eqv.) is the diﬀerential in pre-reform and post-
reform disposable equivalent incomes,  (non-eqv.) the respective diﬀerential in non-equivalent incomes.  (%) denotes
the diﬀerentials in relative terms and is identical for the two concepts. All incomes are in pre-reform (1998) prices. “Gini” is
the Gini coeﬃcient, “GE(-1)” the general entropy index, and “Theil” the Theil index, GE(1), all as deﬁned in Appendix A.
Number of observations is N = 49;484. Data weighted by population weights (36.5 mn. households in the population).
Source: Own calculations using the EVS data (1998).
caused by demand reactions are taken into account, which shall be done in the following.
4.4 Welfare Eﬀects
Additionally to the income gains from the second-round eﬀects, there may occur changes in
household utility if relative prices of assets change and households substitute relatively more
expensive assets for relatively cheaper assets in turn. If asset prices on average increase due to
the reform because the severe reduction of the tax-exempt allowance on capital income oﬀsets
23the reduction of marginal tax rates as far as asset prices are concerned, and if households on
average lose utility from the substitution of relatively more expensive assets, the welfare eﬀects
for an average household in money-metric terms are lower than the income gains.39 Only if
asset prices did not change and households did not adjust their asset demand, the welfare
eﬀects would reduce to the second-round income gains presented in the preceding subsection.
Table 4: Welfare Eﬀects and Second-Round Income Gains by Taxable Income and
Region (in equivalent euros per year)
Upper Pre-Reform Income Welfare Winners
Decile Bound Eqv. Income Gains Eﬀects (%)
Deciles of Tax.Inc.
1 675 13,548 0 -4 55.1
2 1,585 13,961 1 -6 64.1
3 2,808 16,144 4 1 61.5
4 7,084 17,149 53 44 66.3
5 11,376 17,012 339 326 94.1
6 14,758 17,925 493 478 95.6
7 18,509 20,009 596 578 96.8
8 22,782 22,847 700 681 97.3
9 29,465 26,169 789 766 97.5
10 191,714 39,006 1,351 1,278 97.7
Region
West-Germany 21,586 490 469 83.7
East-Germany 16,237 321 309 77.8
Average Household 20,576 458 439 82.6
Notes: Deciles refer to pre-reform taxable household income. Disposable incomes and welfare eﬀects are weighted
by the modiﬁed OECD equivalence scale, see fn. 7 for details. All incomes and welfare eﬀects are in pre-reform
(1998) prices. Number of observations is N = 49;484. Data weighted by population weights (36.5 mn. households
in the population).
Source: Own calculations using the EVS data (1998).
Welfare eﬀects by deciles of taxable income are presented in Table 4. They are needs adjusted
by the applied equivalence scale so that they are comparable in absolute terms to the second-
round income gains that were already presented in Table 3. Welfare eﬀects are quantiﬁed by the
compensating variation, which is approximated by compensated price elasticities, see Section 3.
Estimates for the elasticities are relegated to Table B.1 in Appendix B, where compensated
rate-of-return elasticities from demand-system estimations on the pooled 1998 and 2003 data
39Note that this increase in asset prices is related to the average price diﬀerential over all asset types so that
the decrease in the price for savings of 0.20% is oﬀset by increases in prices for other assets here.
24are compiled.40 Table 4 shows that for an average household, the welfare eﬀects of the tax
reform amount to 439 euros per year in equivalent terms, which corresponds to 2.13% of pre-
reform equivalent income. This is 19 euros or 4.15% less than the average income gains. Thus,
on average, the reform leads to utility losses for the households due to changes of relative asset
prices, which are though compensated by income gains.
This result holds qualitatively over the entire income distribution as well as by region. In
each income decile, welfare eﬀects are lower than income gains on decile average.41 In relative
terms, the diﬀerence between welfare and income eﬀects is greater than average for the deciles
below the median and for the highest decile. In the lowest two deciles, welfare eﬀects are
negative and even exceed income eﬀects in absolute terms. These households on average thus
lose from the reform in welfare terms. However, these losses are with about 5 euros per year
on average very small in absolute terms. While welfare eﬀects for households in East-Germany
are on average 3.74% lower than respective income eﬀects, for households in West-Germany,
they are on average 4.29% lower.
The picture becomes more detailed when grouping households in each income decile into
winners and non-winners of the reform, where the latter group may consist of households
that lose from the reform in welfare terms and such that are unaﬀected. Overall, 82.6% of
all households beneﬁt from the reform, i.e. for them the welfare eﬀects are strictly positive.
Winners are though not equally distributed over the income distribution. While in the lowest
tax bracket, only some 55% of the households have positive welfare eﬀects, and still in the
fourth decile, only 66% are winners, from the ﬁfth decile upwards, there are more than 90%
reform winners in each decile. Winners are moreover unequally distributed over the regions.
While in West-Germany, 83.7% of the households have positive welfare gains from the reform,
in East-Germany, only 77.8% beneﬁt.
The variation of welfare eﬀects over the income distribution (Table 4) is primarily related to
the shift in the tax tariﬀ, as became already apparent from the distribution of the ﬁrst-round
eﬀects by income (Table 1). The welfare eﬀects may, however, moreover vary by the level of
savings, i.e. asset demand. Households with relatively greater asset demand are expected to
suﬀer greater losses from asset substitution than households with lower asset demand. In order
to test this hypothesis, the relation between relative asset demand and welfare eﬀects of the
reform shall be considered conditional on the second-round income gains. This is conducted
with the help of a linear (OLS) regression, where the welfare eﬀect is regressed on asset demand
40The respective elasticities from the system estimations on the 1998 data only are of similar size in most cases.
Only for stocks and bonds, own-price and cross-price elasticities are considerably larger in absolute terms.
The respective price elasticities generally follow from rate-of-return elasticities according to Eq. (5).
41Overall, only for about 12% of all households in the population, welfare eﬀects are greater than income gains.
25related to disposable income (i.e. the gross savings ratio at the household level) in deciles, while
controlling for the second-round income gains. Results from this regression are compiled in
Table B.2 in Appendix B.
It becomes apparent from the coeﬃcient estimates in Table B.2 that the welfare eﬀects
continuously decrease over the distribution of the savings ratio for given second-round income
gains. While the coeﬃcient of the savings ratio is though not signiﬁcantly diﬀerent from zero
up to the seventh decile, households in the three highest savings deciles have signiﬁcantly
lower welfare eﬀects than households in the ﬁrst decile with a same second-round income gain.
Welfare eﬀects in the eighth decile are in equivalent terms 18 euros per year lower than in the
ﬁrst decile, in the ninth decile they are 34 euros lower compared to the ﬁrst decile, and in the
tenth decile they are 71 euros lower.42
These results indicate that households with relatively high savings ratios suﬀer a greater
loss from the tax reform as a result of adjusting their savings behavior and asset demand than
households with relatively low savings ratios. These losses, however, are on average lower than
the second-round income gains – especially if a high savings ratio is associated with high income,
in which case second-round gains are the greatest, also in relative terms – so that the welfare
eﬀects from the reform are on average positive even for households which suﬀer signiﬁcantly
from asset substitution.
All in all, the welfare eﬀects from the reform that are found in this analysis appear to be
relatively small, given rather great estimates for own-rate-of-return elasticities for most of the
assets. On the one hand, this is a consequence of relatively little average changes in net asset
prices, as only for three out of nine assets, price diﬀerentials slightly exceed the range of 1%. On
the other hand, estimates for most of the cross-rate-of-return elasticities are relatively small,
often not signiﬁcantly diﬀerent from zero. Moreover, these are just part of the substitution
eﬀects, as only demand for asset accumulations is modeled here. If in addition households
could substitute between accumulating and liquidating assets, additional welfare eﬀects can be
expected. Also, as stated earlier, it should be emphasized that no labor supply reactions are
considered in this analysis. Taking the result from Haan and Steiner (2005) that labor supply
is increased on average by incentives from the tax reform, income gains should be greater
due to additional hours worked and welfare eﬀects lower by utility losses from substituted
leisure time.43 Moreover, further utility losses could occur if substitutive eﬀects within the
42Note that the coeﬃcient estimate on the income gains is only slightly lower than unity. Thus, for a given
savings decile, an increase in the second-round income gains results in an almost one-to-one translation into
welfare eﬀects.
43Haan and Steiner (2005) ﬁnd that labor supply eﬀects let the income gains increase on average by an
additional 126 euros in annual net household income compared to 725 euros without labor supply eﬀects
(an additional 0.5%-points of pre-reform income). Haan (2007) moreover ﬁnds that welfare eﬀects are on
26consumption decision, i.e. among commodity groups, were taken into account. The income and
welfare eﬀects of the tax reform that are found here should thus rather be interpreted as a part
of the entire eﬀects.
5 Conclusion
Distributional and welfare eﬀects of Germany’s year 2000 tax reform have been quantiﬁed. An
ex-ante analysis of those reform components that aﬀect private households using the 1998 cross
section from oﬃcial survey data on income and consumption in Germany was conducted. A
behavioral microsimulation model for savings and asset demand was constructed in the form of a
structural demand system for asset accumulations. Estimates for compensated price elasticities
were applied to approximate eﬀects of savings reactions and asset substitution on household
utility. Pre-reform and post-reform tax functions were simulated in an income taxation module
that implements Germany’s income tax law and accounts for reform-related shifts in the tax
tariﬀ as well as adjustments at allowances for capital income.
Second-round distributional income eﬀects from the tax reform are estimated to gains of
458 euros per year in equivalent terms for an average household, which corresponds to 2.23%
of disposable equivalent household income. Gains primarily result from signiﬁcant reductions
of marginal tax rates, especially in higher tax brackets, and they are increasing along the
distribution of taxable income, both in absolute as well as relative terms. As a consequence,
inequality in the income distribution increases due to the reform. The increase in inequality
is found to be largely related to the lower end as well as the higher end of the distribution,
while leaving mid-level incomes less aﬀected. Disaggregated by region, the results diﬀer for
households in East- and in West-Germany. While income gains amount to 490 euros (2.27%)
for an average household in West-Germany, they average to some 321 euros (1.98%) only in
East-Germany. However, the increase in inequality is stronger in East-Germany.
The income gains together with changes in relative asset prices resulting from shifts in the
tax tariﬀ and adjustments at allowances for capital income induce households to alter their
consumption-savings behavior as well as asset demand. Demand eﬀects are relatively stronger
for assets for which a strong eﬀect of the income gains is found and for which net prices decrease
through the reform. This is the case for non-owner-occupied housing, for bank deposits, and
for bonds. Demand is also increased for owner-occupied housing, where a strong eﬀect of
the income gains oﬀsets a negative price eﬀect. Aggregating demand changes over all assets
and households, the increase in aggregate net savings in the population is estimated to 4.24
average 34% (153 euros in annual equivalent income) lower than income gains (449 euros) if labor supply
eﬀects are accounted for.
27bn. euros per year. The aggregate increase in disposable household income amounts to 25.5
bn. euros, by which amount in turn the income tax revenue declines. As a consequence, the
aggregate savings rate increases by 0.17 percentage points, from 10.92% to 11.09%.
These changes in the consumption-savings behavior and asset demand cause slight losses in
capital income for an average household, as demand is also increased for assets that became
relatively more expensive through the reform, like stocks. Demand reactions moreover cause
utility losses for most of the households that are related to asset substitution. Resulting welfare
eﬀects are on average lower than income gains, they amount to 439 euros per year in equivalent
terms (2.13% of disposable equivalent income). This result holds qualitatively over the entire
income distribution as well as by region. In each income decile, welfare eﬀects are lower
than income eﬀects. This utility loss from asset substitution is greater in absolute terms for
households with relatively high savings ratios resulting from greater asset demand.
It shall be noted that the income and welfare eﬀects of the tax reform that are found here
are to be interpreted as only a part of the entire eﬀects. If the reform induces households
to increase labor supply, and households lose utility from substituted leisure time, additional
income and welfare eﬀects would occur. This may also be the case if households could addi-
tionally substitute between accumulating and liquidating assets or between various commodity
groups among the consumption decision. It shall thus be left for further research to integrate
the labor supply decision as well as the decision whether to liquidate the stock of assets into the
savings and asset demand model in order to account for additional eﬀects. Future research shall
moreover investigate the question which added value the use of a second-order approximation
to the welfare measure has compared to one of ﬁrst-order. This would clarify the contribution
of the estimation of demand elasticities to approximation precision in this speciﬁc application.
It shall also shed further light on the question what is the driving force behind the utility losses
through this reform, i.e. which fraction of the welfare eﬀects is related to the changes in asset
prices alone and which fraction to asset substitution, and related to this, it could give further
indication under which circumstances the welfare eﬀects would be greater than found here.
The eﬀects found should moreover be interpreted as rather short-term eﬀects. On the one
hand, it is assumed in this analysis that the reform is ﬁnanced primarily by deﬁcit spending so
that the ﬁscal budget is unbalanced in the short term. A long-term analysis would probably
consider that the budget should be balanced some day so that the income gains of the reform
would at least partly be drawn back from the households. On the other hand, the asset market
as well as other markets are assumed to be in equilibrium here. In the long run, this assumption
might be violated and third-run eﬀects via shifts in market asset prices might induce households
to further adjust their asset demand. This opens up another avenue for further research.
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33A Appendix - Data and Methodology
Indices of Inequality
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Approximating the Compensating Variation
A second-order Taylor expansion of c(u0;p1) around (u0;p0) yields (see Deaton and Muellbauer



































Applying the fact that the ﬁrst derivative of the cost function equals Hicksian demand (Mas-










































where hj(u0;p0) denotes pre-reform Hicksian demand for asset j.
Rewriting the deﬁnition of the CV for a compound income and price change in Eq.(6) and









































where b " c
jk is an estimate for the compensated price elasticity of asset j w.r.t. price of asset k.
B Appendix - Results
Table B.1: Compensated Rate-of-Return Elasticities on Unconditional Asset Demand Levels
(from the unconstrained estimation on the pooled 1998 and 2003 data)












Owner Occ. 0:972 :  0:323 0:429 0:035  0:005 0:003 0:001  0:006 0:004
(0:096) : (0:219) (0:081) (0:150) (0:045) (0:021) (0:003) (0:059) (0:034)
Non-Owner 1:185 0:453 :  0:036 0:040  0:006 0:003 0:001  0:007 0:004
(0:380) (0:165) : (0:111) (0:170) (0:050) (0:024) (0:003) (0:067) (0:038)
Mortgages 0:609  0:072 0:106 : 0:026  0:004 0:002 0:000  0:004 0:003
(0:051) (0:023) (0:046) : (0:112) (0:033) (0:016) (0:002) (0:044) (0:025)
Bank Deposits 0:328  0:004  0:002  0:045 : 0:030 0:298 0:596  0:306  0:044
(0:126) (0:010) (0:004) (0:040) : (0:038) (0:028) (0:055) (0:050) (0:029)
Building S.Dep. 0:494  0:002  0:001  0:026 0:165 : 0:082 0:070  0:185  0:027
(0:025) (0:006) (0:002) (0:024) (0:074) : (0:043) (0:110) (0:032) (0:017)
Stocks  0:215  0:005  0:002  0:051 0:489  0:028 :  0:690  0:223  0:071
(0:077) (0:011) (0:004) (0:046) (0:145) (0:048) : (0:195) (0:062) (0:034)
Bonds  0:599  0:006  0:003  0:065 0:551 0:263  0:532 :  0:164  0:121
(0:581) (0:014) (0:005) (0:059) (0:189) (0:086) (0:224) : (0:105) (0:049)
Insurances 1:158  0:001  0:001  0:015 0:125  0:071  0:376  0:709 :  0:043
(0:020) (0:003) (0:001) (0:014) (0:043) (0:016) (0:033) (0:084) : (0:010)
Credits 0:675  0:003  0:001  0:028 0:198 0:022  0:111  0:687  0:004 :
(0:019) (0:006) (0:002) (0:026) (0:081) (0:028) (0:053) (0:134) (0:036) :
Notes: Standard errors computed by the delta method in parentheses. Signiﬁcance levels: *p < 0:10, **p < 0:05, ***p < 0:01.
Elasticities are computed at the mean of all covariates. b "
(r)
jj is the compensated unconditional own-rate elasticity of asset j on
asset levels. b "
(r)
jk is the respective compensated unconditional cross-rate elasticity.
Source: Own calculations using the EVS data (1998, 2003).
35Table B.2: Estimates for OLS Regression of Welfare Eﬀects on Sav-
ings Ratio
dep.var.: welfare eﬀect in eqv. euros per year Coeﬀ. (SE)
Second-Round Distributional Eﬀects:
income gain 0.9857 (0.0024)***
Deciles of Savings Ratio:
Decile 1 (ref.)
Decile 2 -0.5201 (7.6263)
Decile 3 -2.3176 (7.4815)
Decile 4 -3.9545 (7.3990)
Decile 5 -6.3933 (7.3581)
Decile 6 -8.5658 (7.3106)
Decile 7 -11.5070 (7.2739)
Decile 8 -17.7095 (7.2524)*
Decile 9 -34.2905 (7.2712)***




Notes: Standard errors in parentheses. Signiﬁcance levels: yp < 0:10 *p < 0:05, **p < 0:01,
***p < 0:001. Savings ratio is for gross savings, deﬁned as total assets disposable related to
disposable income.
Source: Own calculations using the EVS data (1998).
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